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Battling Over Patents: The Impact of Oil States on the 
Generic Drug Industry 
Jonathan J. Darrow, Ameet Sarpatwari, Gregory Curfman* 
Abstract: 
In the 2018 case of Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s 
Energy Group, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of inter partes review, a non-judicial proceeding 
for challenging patents that was created by Congress as part of 
the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. By establishing 
inter partes review, Congress hoped to rebalance patent policy to 
make it faster and less costly to invalidate erroneously granted 
patents in all fields of technology. In the pharmaceutical 
industry, generic drug companies have embraced inter partes 
review, filing hundreds of challenges in the first five years after 
its creation, with moderate success. Biologics, which make up a 
growing class of pharmaceutical products, are sometimes 
covered by dozens or scores of patents. As more of these 
complex therapeutics are developed and approved, inter partes 





In 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a new non-
judicial proceeding for challenging patents, called inter partes review, in Oil 
States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group.1 Oil States, the owner of a 
 
* Jonathan J. Darrow, S.J.D., LL.M., J.D., M.B.A., Assistant Professor, Harvard Medical School. 
1620 Tremont St., Suite 3030, Boston, MA 02120 Phone: 347-792-2246, Fax: 617-232-8602, 
Email: jjdarrow@bwh.harvard.edu. Ameet Sarpatwari, Ph.D., J.D., Assistant Professor, Harvard 
Medical School. Gregory Curfman, M.D., Deputy Editor, Journal of the American Medical 
Association. From the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of 
Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital. LL.M. “waived” upon admission to the S.J.D. program. This research was supported by 
Arnold Ventures, with additional support from the Harvard-MIT Center for Regulatory Science and 
the Engelberg Foundation. 
 1.. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
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patent on hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) technology that was invalidated in a 
challenge before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), an 
administrative agency, argued that inter partes review unconstitutionally 
deprived patent owners of their right to be heard in a court, as guaranteed by 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and of their right to a trial by jury, as 
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. In Oil States’ view, the private property 
rights embodied in its patent should not have been subject to abrogation by a 
non-judicial body whose members answered to a political appointee. 
Although Oil States addressed a patent directed to technology in the energy 
industry, the failed challenge to the inter partes review procedure has 
implications for any field of technology in which patents play an important role, 
including pharmaceuticals. More than 1,100 drug products are protected by at 
least one patent, with an average of more than three patents for each patent-
protected drug.2 The battle over patents in the pharmaceutical industry has a long 
history, the modern portion of which began in 1984 with the enactment of the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (“Hatch-Waxman 
Act”). Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, litigation over patents can trigger a 30-
month stay of approval of a generic drug application in order to provide time for 
the litigation to resolve, potentially allowing even weak patents to have an 
important exclusive effect in the market. The Act also provides brand-name 
manufacturers with the ability to extend the expiration date of one patent per 
drug product for up to five years, to make up for time lost during clinical testing 
and U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review. 
To incentivize challenges to weak patents that were delaying generic 
competition, the Act provided the first generic drug manufacturer that brought a 
patent challenge with the possibility of obtaining a 180-day period during which 
no other generic drug company could enter the market.3 But bringing suit in 
federal court was (and remains) expensive and time-consuming for patent 
challengers, in all fields of technology. Where more than $25 million is at 
stake—as is the case for virtually all litigated pharmaceutical patents—the costs 
of asserting or defending a Hatch-Waxman patent dispute average approximately 
$1.1 million or more per litigant.4 
In the mid-2000s, Congress began to consider whether a rebalancing of 
 
 2.. Reed F. Beall & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Tertiary Patenting on Drug-Device Combination 
Products in the United States, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 142, 143 tbl.1 (2018). 
 3. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (“Hatch-Waxman Act”), Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589 (1984). 
 4. Donika P. Pentcheva & Frank L. Gerratana, AIPLA 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 42 (2017). The $1.1 million median figure represents a dramatic decline from 2013 and 
2015, when medians of $6 million and $5 million, respectively, were reported. Id. It is not clear 
whether the decline represents a trend, or whether it is related to inter partes review. 
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patent policy was necessary to ensure a favorable market environment.5 After six 
years of hearings and deliberation, it concluded that “flaws in the [patent] 
system . . . have become unbearable,” and that change was needed to 
appropriately respond to the “growing sense that questionable patents are too 
easily obtained and . . . too difficult to challenge.”6 The culmination of 
Congress’s deliberations was the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,7 which 
made a number of changes to the patent laws, including the establishment of a 
new type of administrative proceeding called inter partes review. The new 
proceeding allowed the USPTO to reconsider its previous decision to grant a 
patent and was intended to be faster and less expensive than court litigation.8 
Congress also reconstituted the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences, an administrative tribunal that addressed matters such as appeals 
from patent rejections by examiners, into a new Patent Trial and Appeal Board. 
Like its predecessor, the PTAB comprised administrative patent judges who sat 
in 3-judge panels to make determinations about patent validity without involving 
juries. But inter partes review allowed patent challengers to participate in patent 
challenge proceedings to a greater extent than had previously been possible, as 
part of an adversarial process that resembled litigation.9 
From the perspective of the patent challenger, inter partes review had a 
number of advantages over litigation. Estimated costs of the new proceeding 
were approximately ten percent as much as litigation, and the PTAB was 
generally required to make a judgment within one year of its decision to begin 
review.10 A patent’s obviousness could be established by a mere preponderance 
of the evidence, rather than by clear-and-convincing evidence, as would be 
required in court,11 and patent claims would be interpreted according to their 
broadest reasonable interpretation rather than according to their ordinary 
meaning, increasing the probability that a claim would be invalidated as obvious 
over the prior art. In contrast with federal lawsuits, in which generic drug 
manufacturers generally seek to demonstrate patent invalidity only after brand-
name manufacturers have sued for patent infringement, inter partes review 
proceedings may be brought by any party at virtually any time. This allows pro-
 
 5. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 57 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 88 
(listing relevant Congressional hearings on patent reform beginning in 2005). 
 6. Id. at 39. 
 7. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 8. See generally Evan J. Wallach & Jonathan J. Darrow, Federal Circuit Review of USPTO 
Inter Partes Review Decisions, by the Numbers, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 105 (2016) 
(summarizing the background that motivated the America Invents Act). 
 9. Id. at 109. 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2018). 
 11. Jonathan J. Darrow, Reed F. Beall & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Will Inter Partes Review Speed 
US Generic Drug Entry?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1139, 1139 (2017). 
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active challenges by generic drug firms and expands the list of prospective 
challengers to include public interest groups, other competing generic 
manufacturers, or even hedge funds seeking to profit from patent invalidation by 
betting against a company’s stock.12 
By the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Oil States, more than 
7,500 petitions for inter partes review had been filed, resulting in the partial or 
complete invalidation of more than 1,600 patents across a broad range of 
technologies.13 In the pharmaceutical sector, at least 198 patents covering 134 
small-molecule drug products had already been challenged in inter partes review, 
with approximately half of completed challenges resulting in at least partial 
victory for the patent challenger.14 In 2018 alone, almost 100 patents in the 
biopharmaceutical space were challenged,15 and the number of drug patents 
challenged each quarter has been approximately four times as high as the number 
of new drugs approved each quarter.16 
Although the patent in Oil States did not directly concern the pharmaceutical 
industry, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), 
an industry trade group, filed an amicus brief in support of Oil States. PhRMA 
warned the Court that pharmaceutical companies invest “hundreds of billions of 
dollars” in drug development, and that these investments, on which future 
innovations rely, “make sense only because the resulting intellectual property is 
respected as property.”17 In essence, PhRMA’s position as to inter partes review 
echoed the age-old battle over the patent system more generally, which has 
persisted at least since the patent abolition movement of the 1800s.18 The basic 
arguments are relatively straightforward: Those favoring stronger, broader, or 
longer patent protection suggest that patents are needed to adequately incentivize 
the initial creation of new inventions, while those favoring more limited patent 
protection or opposing it altogether emphasize the restrictions on use that accrue 
 
 12. Id. at 1139–40. 
 13. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT TRIAL 
AND APPEAL BOARD, Feb. 2018, at 3, 11 (2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20180228.pdf. 
 14. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The Generic Drug Industry Embraces a Faster, Cheaper 
Pathway for Challenging Patents, 17 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y 47, 51 (2019). 
 15. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS IPR, PGR, CBM: PATENT TRIAL 
AND APPEAL BOARD, June 2019, at 4 (2019), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_2019-06-30.pdf. 
 16. Darrow et al., supra note 14, at 53. 
 17. Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 6, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365 (2018) (No. 16-712). 
 18. See generally Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth 
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950); Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
899 (2002) (describing the patent controversy in the nineteenth century). 
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once inventions have been created. 
Notwithstanding PhRMA’s argument, this larger policy question was not at 
issue in Oil States, which instead required the Court to resolve whether Congress 
could constitutionally delegate the inter partes review function to a non-judicial 
body.19 The Court upheld Congress’s action, rejecting Oil States’ challenge in a 
7-to-2 decision. The Court explained that although Article III generally prohibits 
Congress from conferring judicial power on entities outside of the traditional 
court system, Congress has greater latitude when public rather than private rights 
are involved. According to the Court, inter partes review “falls squarely within 
the public rights doctrine,” which covers matters that arise between the 
government and those subject to its authority.20 Specifically, the grant of a patent 
is a matter between the government, which grants a public franchise in the form 
of a patent, and the patentee, which discloses its invention in return. Because 
inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of the original patent grant, the 
Court ruled that Congress permissibly assigned authority to the PTAB. The Court 
emphasized that its ruling was limited and did not speak to whether a proceeding 
similar to inter partes review would be constitutional if used to settle patent 
infringement (as opposed to invalidity) cases, which might be more likely to 
involve private rights, or if it were not subject to review by an Article III court. 
The Court found that the Seventh Amendment’s right to a trial by jury also had 
not been offended by the creation of inter partes review. Under Supreme Court 
precedent, once Congress properly assigned responsibility for adjudication to a 
non-Article III body such as the PTAB, the Seventh Amendment posed no 
independent bar. 
Regarding PhRMA’s concern that post-grant administrative invalidation 
could upset the legitimate, investment-backed expectations of businesses, the 
Court observed that patents confer only those rights that the statute prescribes, 
and that at the time of grant these rights are subject to the qualification that the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may reexamine and even cancel a patent’s 
claims at a later time if it determines statutory criteria were in fact not met. Even 
before the creation of administrative patent review, a patent did not guarantee a 
particular duration of exclusivity, since it could be challenged and invalidated by 
the judiciary. 
Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts dissented, echoing the concern of 
Oil States that political appointees may be more likely than independent judges to 
issue decisions that follow political interests, potentially undermining “much 
hard work and no little investment”21—a concern magnified in 2019 when the 
 
 19. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Question 1, at i, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. 
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712). 
 20. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1368. 
 21. Id. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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Federal Circuit held that members of the PTAB could be removed without 
cause.22 The dissent cautioned that important constitutional protections are often 
inefficient, such as the need to obtain a warrant before a search or conduct a jury 
trial before a criminal conviction, and that the expediency of PTAB review is not 
a justification for dispensing with constitutional safeguards. Despite these 
concerns, a majority of the Court found inter partes review constitutionally 
permissible, and the new proceeding survived its day in court. 
The Oil States decision has important implications across all industries but 
may be particularly significant with respect to timely access to affordable generic 
drugs. Most drug patents that have been challenged in inter partes review are 
directed to aspects of the drug product other than its active ingredient.23 Because 
these “secondary” patents may have expiration dates that extend well beyond the 
end of primary patents’ expiration dates, challenging those that should not have 
issued because they were obvious could significantly advance the date of generic 
entry. The filing of a petition for inter partes review also does not trigger the 30-
month stay available under the Hatch-Waxman Act, potentially shortening the 
time to generic drug entry for those products protected only by weak patents that 
would be found invalid if challenged. 
Although some commentators have asserted that inter partes review makes 
little difference on the timing of generic drug entry,24 circumstantial evidence 
suggests otherwise. Hedge funds have challenged drug patents in inter partes 
review in combination with shorting a company’s stock, a stratagem that would 
result in profits only to the extent the market believes the challenge will impact 
generic entry. Generic drug firms quickly embraced the proceeding, filing 274 
challenges in the pharmaceutical space between September 16, 2012 and April 
24, 2017.25 And the branded drug industry has vigorously opposed inter partes 
review, not only as reflected in PhRMA’s amicus brief in Oil States, but by 
proposals that drug patents be exempted from eligibility for inter partes review 
altogether.26 
The Court’s vindication of Congress’s choice to streamline patent challenges 
 
 22. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 23. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The Generic Drug Industry Embraces a Faster, Cheaper 
Pathway for Challenging Patents, 17 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y 47, 51 (2019). 
 24. Sarah Karlin-Smith, Patent Review: Not Super Effective in Speeding Early Generic Entry, 
POLITICO (August 1, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/tipsheets/prescription-
pulse/2016/08/part-d-premiums-remain-stableptos-patent-review-isnt-speeding-many-
genericsportman-calls-for-more-opioid-funding-215637. 
 25. Darrow et al., supra note 23, at 51. 
 26. Letter from James C. Greenwood, President and CEO, BIO, and John J. Castellani, 
President and CEO, PhRMA, to Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, et al. 
(July 15, 2015), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/joint-phrma-bio-letter-on-ipr-
071515.pdf. 
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before an administrative body may be especially important for the rapidly 
growing class of biologic drugs. These drugs are not subject to the regulatory 
scheme of the Hatch-Waxman Act, including its 180-day generic drug 
exclusivity incentive, so an inexpensive means of challenging patents may be 
particularly critical. Although a one-year exclusivity provision is available for 
“interchangeable” biosimilars, this higher standard has not yet been met for any 
product, and follow-on biologics have so far been approved only as ordinary 
biosimilars that do not benefit from the one-year non-patent exclusivity 
provision. Some biologics, such as the blockbuster tumor necrosis factor-alpha 
monoclonal antibody adalimumab (Humira), have been protected by veritable 
intellectual property “fortresses” made up of 100 or more patents.27 In these 
cases, the impact of inter partes review is more complex. Although the cost of 
the administrative proceeding is generally lower if only one patent is at issue, this 
benefit may erode for drugs protected by larger numbers of patents. Only a single 
patent can be challenged in each inter partes review proceeding, in contrast to 
court litigation where multiple patents can be addressed at once. 
Overall, however, the Supreme Court’s preservation of an efficient 
administrative procedure for challenging weak patents can only benefit generic 
drug and biosimilar manufacturers that seek to enter the market sooner. When 
these challenges successfully lead to earlier entry by competitors, they can be 
expected to bring down prices, including those on some of the most expensive 
drugs and biologics in the world. Following the Court’s decision in Oil States, 
inter partes review will help to ensure that invalid patents are not preventing 
patient access to important new medicines. 
 
 27. Complaint at 1, AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 16-cv-00666 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 2016), ECF 
No. 1, dismissed. 
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